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GOVERNMENT LIABILITY IN TORT EDWIN M. BORCHAIR
The common law and the political theory underlying both British and American constitutional law have been regarded as a bulwark of protection to the individual in his relations with the Government. The "rule of law" which Dicey and others extol is designed by judicial control to restrict within the bounds of legality the operation of the governmental machine in its contact with the citizen. Yet it requires but a slight appreciation of the facts to realize that in Anglo-American law the individual citizen is left to bear almost all the risks of a defective, negligent, perverse or erroneous administration of the State's functions, an unjust burden which is becoming graver and more frequent as the Government's activities become more diversified and as we leave to administrative officers in even greater degree the determination of the legal relations of the individual citizen. Obviously the Administration cannot be held to the obligation of guaranteeing the citizen against all errors or defects, for life in an organized community requires a certain number of sacrifices and even risks. The unexampled expansion of the police power in the United States daily illustrates the uncompensated sacrifices to which the individual is exposed by the rightful operation of the State's public powers. Yet there is no reason why the most flagrant of the injuries wrongfully sustained by the citizen, those arising from the torts of officers, should be allowed to rest, as they now generally do, in practice if not in theory, at the door of the unfortunate citizen alone. This hardship becomes the more incongruous when it is realized that it is greatest in countries like Great Britain and the United States, where democracy is assumed to have placed the individual on the highest plane of political freedom and individual justice. When Justice Miller of the United States Supreme Court remarked in Gibbons v. United States' that "no govern-(1868, U. S.) 8 Wall. 269.
ment has ever held itself liable to individuals for the misfeasance, laches or unauthorized exercise of power by its officers or agents," his horizon was extremely limited, for he overlooked the fact that practically every country of western Europe has long admitted such liability. There seems no sound reason why the English-speaking countries, where the public service is -usually in less professional hands than on the continent, should not adopt modern social and legal principles in deterniining the legal relations between the Government in its administration of the public services, the officers and agents whom it employs for this service, and the individual members of the community. It was Lord. Macaulay who remarked that "the primary end of Government is the protection of the persons and_ property of men."
The reatsdn for this long-continued and grooving injustice in AngloAmerican law rests, of course, upon a medieval Enklish theory that "the King can do no wrong," which without sufficient understanding was introduced with the common law into this country, and has survived mainly by reason of its antiquity.
2 The facts that the conditions which gave it birth and that the theory of absolutism which kept it alive in England never prevailed in this country and have since been discarded by the most monarchical countries of Europe, have nevertheless been unavailing to secure legislative reconsideration of the propriety and justification of the rule that the State is not legally liable for the torts of its officers. To be sure, we profess to ease the conscience by according the injured individual an action against the wrong-doing officer-frequently a person without pecuniary responsibility-or else, under our decentralized system of administbiation, by permitting an action against political subdivisions of the State'and local bodies and corporations for injuries inflicted when acting in their "private" or "corporate" as distinguished froni their "governmental" capacities. But no serious effort has been made to penetrate the mysticism encumbering this department of the law and to relieve it of its theological and metaphysical conceptions and misconceptions.
Realization, spasmodically by the courts, and occasionally in particular cases by legislatures, of the unwarranted hardship often worked by the rule that the State is not liable for the torts of its officers, and the desire to square the demands of justice with the maintenance of a legal anachronism canonized as a legal maxim, have brought about the result, by the introduction of fictions, artificial distinctions and concessions to 'That this maxim was misunderstood even by Blackstone and Coke, see the excellent monograph of Ludwik Ehrlich, Proceedings against the Crown (192i) 42-49, The maxim mnerely meant that the King was not privileged to do wrong.
-if his acts were against the -law, they were injuriae (wrongs). Bracton, while ambiguous in his several statements as to the relation between the King and the law, did not intend to convey the idea that he was incapable of committing a legal wrong. Ehrlich, op. cit., 43. . Indeed, there-appears to have been a considerable measure of redress obtainable, though_ not damages. Ibid. 44-46. prerogative of the King's immunity from the jurisdiction and alleged resulting infallibility, the apotheosis of absolutism, have by evolution devolved upon the democratic American people, presumably both as citizens of the States and of 'the United States. The awkwardness of this conclusion is heighten'ed by the fact that whereas in England, to prevent the jurisdictional immunity resulting in too gross an injustice, the petition of right, whose origin has been traced back to the thirteenth century, 10 was devised as. a substitute for a formal action against the Crown, in America no substitute except an appeal to the generosity of the legislature has in most jurisdictions been afforded. In only a few states is judicial relief available. The difficulty of reconciling the royal prerogative with democratic government has, in fact, led some of our courts to deny the applicability of the English doctrine of kingly immunity and put it merely on the general ground of public policy, or what Justice Millet called "the general doctrine of publicists," that "the supreme power in every state, wherever it may reside, shall not be compelled, by process of courts of its own creation, to defend itself from assaults in those courts."' 1 It will be recalled, however, *In Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886) 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. lo64, Mathews, J., said: "In our system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government,"--a somewhat doubtful proposition--"sovereignty itself remains with the people by whom and for whom all government exists and acts." So Miller, J., in Uniited Slates v. Lee (1883) io6 U. S. 196, 2o8, i Sup. Ct. 251: "Under our system the people .... are the sovereign." See also LeRoy G. Pilling, An Interpretatio n of the Eleventh Amendment (1917) by. petition of right exists only for the purpose of reconciling the dignity of the Crown and the rights of the subject, and to protect the latter against any injury arising from the acts of the former; but it is no part of its object to enlarge or alter those rights." The construction denying relief f~r torts has greatly narrowed the injuries for which the subject can sue by petition, and yet the petition is broader in its remedies than are the bulk of the American statutes and decisions.
' United States v. Lee (1883) io6 U. S. 196, 1 Sup. Ct. z4g. See also Langfbrd v. United States (1879) i1o U. S. 34I, 343, in which Miller, 3., remarked that "we do not understand that either in reference to the government of the United States, or of the several states, or of any of their officers, the English maxim has any that it took a constitutional' amendment, the eleventh, to establish this as an American federal policy with respect to the states of the union, 14 Since many states have not yet granted such consent and since those that have, have so qualified it as to exclude practically all cases of liability for tort, it is proper to show that the reasons which once may have been deemed to justify .the public polity of immunity from suit and responsibility do not in fact to-day prevail, and that public policy now requires that the State shall voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of judicial tribunals to answer for torts committed by its officers against the person or property "of its citizens. Whether a valid distinction can analytically be drawn between substantive liability-as on contract, as some courts insiste'-and procedural immunity from suit, is a question which will be more fully considered in the discussion of theory in the second part of this study.
The English system of subjecting the Crown to suit by petition of existence in this country." But Professor Burgess adopts the full theory that "the'State can do no wrong." i Political Science and Constitutional Law (I8gi) 57. In Langford v. United States, supra, it is said "The English maxim does. not declare that the Government, or those who administer it, can do no wrong." "(1793 U. S.) 2 Dallas 419, 429. Chief Justice Jay (at p. 47i) saw no incompatibility between suability and sovereignty. Cf. Mr. Justice Holmes, infra. Jay saw no sound distinction between a citizen suing the forty thousand citizens of Philadelphia, which every one admitted, and the fifty thousand citizens of Delaware. It is true, however, that Hamilton, Marshall and Madison had not contemplated that a state could be sued by a citizen in the federal courts.
IThe protest of several of the states against Chisholn v. Georgia, which led to the Eleventh Amendment, was induced not by any apprehension that the dignity' of the State would be degraded by compulsory appearance before the federal court, but by the very practical fear that they might by such compulsory jurisdiction be compelled to pay their debts. See Marshall, C.J., right has been deemed a proceeding not of grace but of right, 1 though in theory the fiat may be withheld at any time and is withheld in claims arising out of tort. Practice has, however, developed the rule of law that the petition of right lies to obtain from the Crown restitution of lands or goods, or if this is impossible, then money damages for wrongful detention, or damages. for breach of contract, including goods supplied to the Crown or to the public service:1 7 Curiously, it was not until 1874 that it was definitely established that damages could be recovered for breach of contract,"" though it must be left to conjecture why breach of contract was less a "wrong" than an ordinary tort, or why the recovery not barred by the tort element involved in disseisin or wrongful detention of chattels, realror personal, should not logically 'be extended to include conversiol and other torts against the" ' subject 1 9 In the United States, contract claims have been recoverable in the Court of Claims since 1855. In England, damages for torts were recoverable against the wrongdoing officer, who generally at least could not plead in defense either reasons of state or command of the CrownAor King.
2 0 Even this limited protection to the citizen has now been much qualified by the growth of administrative justice with its discretionary acts which escape judicial review. 21 But an even greater injustice is done by reason of the maxim that the doctrine of respondeat ' As in the case of the extraordinary legal remedies, the discretion in granting the writ has by practice been hardened-into rule. superior has no application to the King or Crown-or, with us, the State-which in theory can neither do nor authorize a wrong, and that even a superior officer is not liable for the torts of his subordinates,' unless he expressly commands the tort-not a common case. 2 2 Thus the individual's recourse is usually confined to a subordinate wrongdoer, upon whom the risks of accepting public office fall with unjust severity and with detriment to the public service. Small pay with large risks induces fear to enforce the law. A health officer, for example, who in good faith believes a horse to have glanders or anthrax and thereupon orders it shot may, on the verdict of a lay jury that he was mistaken, find himself subjected to heavy damages, 23 without support or sympathy from the Government, with the result that his successors or colleagues will probably decline thereafter to assume such risks and will permit the community at large to bear the risk and the danger. Nor, as already observed, is it any defense to the subordinate that he acted under orders of a superior, even the highest executive officer, if the order proves for any reason to have been illegal. This defective social engineering can only be rightly improved by placing the risk of honest official mistakes upon the community, where it properly belongs. The curious view seems to prevail that it would be harmful to the State to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior to the injuries committed by its officers upon members of the public. So in Russel v. Devon County (1788) 2 T. R. 667 it was said "it is better for the individual to suffer than for the public to be inconvenienced"; and in Robertson v. Sichel, supra, quoting Story: "[The Government] does not guarantee to any person the fidelity of any of its officers or agents whom it employs; since that would involve it, in all its operations, in endless embarrassments and difficulties, which would be subversive of the public interests." How crude a view of social policy is expressed in these opinions will become apparent when the principles, theory and practice of the countries of continental Europe in this respect are examined in subsequent articles, infra. 'Miller v. Horton (1891) Here we cannot leave out of account the fact that two states of this country, at least, have evidenced a high sense'of social responsibility and individual justice by making the state pecuniarily responsible, up to a limited sum, to the victims of errors in the administration of criminal justice. Persons erroneously convicted of crime in California and Wisconsin may, upon proof of the mistake, obtain compensation from the state up to $5,000, on the theory that the state, in the pursuit-of crime, a public function, has erroneously taken the liberty of, and therefore imposed an unjust burden upon, a private individual in the public interest. For such mistakes, as is the case in most of the countries of Europe, the risk should be borne by the community and not by the unfortunate victim alone.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
So strongly entrenched in the judicial'mind is the principle of immunity in tort that legislative consent to suit, though granted in the broadest language, has been deemed to exclude liability for tort. Thus, under a Washington statute providing that "any person . ..having any claim against the state of Washington shall have the right to begin an action against the state in the superior court," it was held that "claim"? was .ynonymous with "cause of action," and as there never had been any cause of action arising out of the torts of officers, the statute was construed merely to provide a remedy against the state by suit in existing causes of action, but not to create any new grounds of liability, nor waive any former defense 26 In New York the Court of Appeals has property by health officers acting under mistaken belief that they were destroying a nuisance, or who otherwise wrongfully destroyed private property. N. Y. Cons.
Laws, i9o7, see. 1oi; New York .City Charter, N. Y. Laws, igoi, ch. 466, sec.
ii96; Freund, Cases on Administrative Law (i91i) 358. The legislature frequently makes special appropriations to compensate the owners of diseased cattle destroyed in the public interest. See New York Times, Apr. 2o, i924. In England, where a ship is detained on suspicion of being unsafe or unseaworthy, 'and on later examination proves to be safe and seaworthy, the Government assumes the obligation to pay compensation to the owner. Thompson v. Farrer (I882) L. R 9 Q. B. Div. 372, 384. This is so obviously sensible, that it is surprising how slow our states and cities are to appreciate its practical justice.
" Wis. Sts. 1921, sec. 32o3a; Sts. Calif., 1913, ch. i65 Arizona and California permit by statute suits for negligence, but the few cases decided deny liability on this ground. In most of the states that permit suit, it is either expressly limited to contracts, or it is left in broad terms which the courts have usually construed to exclude liability in tort. In the absence of constitutional provision for or against, the legislature undoubtedly has the power to make the State liable for the torts of its officers. recommendatory only, requiring a legislative appropriation. This is true also where the determination is final, as in the case of the United States Court of Claims, but no one could seriously object to the inadequacy of such form of declaratory judgment, which indeed in practice has rarely, if ever, been refused satisfaction by the legislature. Certainly, the judicial method of determining the validity of claims is far preferable to the customary appeal to the legislature, with its political .implications. In this respect, we have long lagged behind England where the sovereign immunity from suit was at least accompanied by legal machinery, by petition of right, for trying judicially certain types of cases.
WHEN SUIT AGAINST OFFICER IS CONSIDERED SUIT AGAINST STATE
In the light of the limited jurisdiction of the courts over claims against the State and the wider range of liability-of officers, especially in respect of torts, it becomes important to determine when a suit against an officer is in reality a suit against the state and within its protective immunity. Inasmuch as the state can act only through officers, it would always be possible to implead the state in the guise of -its officer were the courts not careful to maintain proper criteria between personal acts and acts in the name of the state. This the courts have attempted to do, but a survey of their effort in this direction is hardly convincing of the existence or soundness of the alleged principles they assume to adopt. In a general way, the distinctions sought to be maintained in England between acts of government and administrative or corporate acts, which lie at the basis of the rules of public liability in the countries of continental Europe and in our law of municipal corporations, respond more nearly, though by no means satisfactorily, to logical tests than do the distinctions made in American law. Thus, in England, an effort is made to find whether the officer or corporate body created for the accomplishment of a public service is an emanation of the Crown in its governmental capacity or a subordinate officer, board, or body carrying on ministerial or "corporate" work as a substithte for private enterprise. The distinctions made are not satisfactory, for into the determination enter considerations of the historical origin, private or public, of the board "or body or 'function, and its operation in the local as opposed to the national interest and the nature of its control j41 but even these tests are inadequate, for at one time education making them suable,-though we are told that a public officer cannot be made liable on contracts made by -him for the public servicek---nevertheless no execution can issue because their property is Crown property. Nor are our difficulties relieved by the distinctions sought to be made in England and in some cases in this country between the misfeasance and nonfeasance of officers, the former carrying liability, the latter immunity. 55 The effort of the British courts to reconcile the immunity of the Crown from suit in tort with the liability of public officers resulted in the attempt to find a line of division between acts of the Crown or government, which covered with the mantle of immunity the officers through whom such acts must perforce be accomplished, and tortious non-governmental or "corporate" acts of the individual officer or body, which were not protected by the shield of the Crown. We have seen that this separation, involving also a denial of the principle of respondeat superior in official "governmental" relations, and other manifestations of solicitude for superior officers, has resulted practically in limiting the recourse of the injured citizen, even where he could sue, to an action against subordinate and usually irresponsible minor officials, which in practical effect was not far removed from a denial of relief of any kind.
56
In the United States, with unimportant and disputed exceptions, 57 even so much of a scientific effort as is involved in separating "governmental" from "corporate" acts cannot be discovered in the attempt to reconcile State immunity with official responsibility, though such an effort has been made in determining the liability of municipal corporations and occasionally, but without substantial merit, of corporations or boards organized to perform particular state functions. In State relations, the effort to apply the inhibitions of the Eleventh Amendment in the federal courts has resulted in a haphazard application of tests to determine merely when a suit directed against an officer or corporate body existing by state authority is in reality a suit against the State. That effort has been much complicated by the necessity of reconciling the immunity from suit secured by the Eleventh Amendment with the constitutional prohibitions upon the states against impairing the obli- Greenhow, where the rule was adopted that the question as to whether the state is being sued is to be determined, not by the nominal parties to the record, but by consideration of the effect upon the state of the judgment or decree to be rendered, and of the real repository of the adverse interest, the state or officer personally, against whom the decree would effectively operate.
6 0 If the state is the real party in interest or an indispensable party to enable the court to grant the relief sought, though an officer is the defendant, the suit cannot lie, except, as we shall see, to restrain an officer from seeking to enforce an unconstitutional state law. Thus, if the object of the suit against an officer is to compel a specific performance of the state's contract, 61 or to obtain possession of property of which the state claims title and possession, 62 (1921) 256 an officer to pay money out of the state treasury,6 3 or to prevent the state from using its own property or property which it claims as its own," 4 the federal courts decline jurisdiction. But when the -State comes into the market place and engages in business, it might be supposed that it rendered itself subject to law and the usual iegal relations. Yet while the Supreme Court has recognized this distinction with respect to corporations chartered and partly owned by the State, 5 The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions enjoined or mandamused high officials of the state'in the performance of acts which, violative of the private rights of citizens, were regarded as ministerial in-character. 70 That many of the acts thus enjoined or mandamused are in reality state acts, for example, the compulsory levy of taxes to pay state bonds, is hardly to be doubted, but if the court finds that the duty is owed to the plaintiff and -is sought to be evaded whether by authority of an invalid state law or otherwise, it has no hesitation in directing the state officer to perform his legal duty, though even in such cases an action for damages, at least against higher officials, will not be entertained.
71
Not the least of the difficulties of reconciling the Eleventh with the Fourteenth Amendment and other constitutidnal inhibitions on the State has lain in the attempt to show that in enjoining or subjecting to other suit the State officer acting under a statute violating the constitutional rights of the citizen ufnder the Fourteenth Amendment, the State itself was not being sued. powers and the officer is not protected by the statute against judicial control by suit. The illegal act is not then the act of the State, but the illegal personal act of the officer "who falsely speaks and acts in its name." Whether or not it required this circuitous and perhaps specious reasoning to enable the Supreme Court to protect the constitutional rights of the individual against impairment by the State, it is nevertheless a fact that the Supreme Court has never hesitated to enjoin or otherwise control the instrument or agent of the State acting under an unconstitutional statute or, of course, acting unconstitutionally in the execution of a valid statute.
78
It may be well to recall here that the same argument of ultra vires might, if admitted as applicable to the relation between the state and its officer committing an illegal act, serve automatically to absolve the state from all liability, for it is doubtless true that the state, even admitting the power, never, or very rarely, authorizes a tort.
7 4 Fortunately, this plea of ultra vires has not been admitted in this relation, any more than it has in the case of corporations, including municipal corporations, generally, yet it has troubled the theory of state responsibility not a little. Its effect is practically attained, of course, through the antiquated doctrine of State immunity. and infallibility and the inapplicability to the State of the usual rules of agency, 7 5 leaving the officer, and then only the most subordinate as a rule, to bear personally the consequences of his mistake, negligence or misfeasance in the performance of official duties, and leaving to the individual merely this often doubtful remedy. Once regard the officer as the embodiment or organ of the State, then all remedy for negligence disappears. The State's immunity from suit covers the officer. While the remedy against the officer is generally effective where its purpose is to recover specific property unlawfully withheld by the officer and not claimed by the State, 7 6 and where the action of the officer can be controlled by injunction, mandamus or other coercive relief, as in the cases already mentioned, its effectiveness in an action for damages is, of course, limited to the pecuniary responsibility of the wrong-doing official, who is not, except in rare cases, protected by an order, if actually illegal, emanating from a superior executive officer. 77 The practical requirement, thus enforced, that the subordinate officer assume the risk of the constitutionality, legality and correctness of the orders of his superior officers alone demonstrates the injustice and inequity of the existing rule as to all parties concernedthe subordinate officer, the victim of the injury, and the State or public which employs all officers. It is flagrantly defective social engineering.
The Supreme Court no longer seems to regard as important the point once raised that if the act sought to be enjoined is not the state's act, then the Fourteenth Amendment and the due process clause is not involved, whereas if it is the state's act, then the Eleventh Amendment interposes to deny jurisdiction.
7 8 This point, raised in the Ayres case, with respect to the effect of the Eleventh Amendment on the article prohibiting the states from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts, has served to draw a distinction between the mere breach of a contract, upon which suit will not be entertained against the State, and the effect of the inhibited law, which will be treated as null and void. an injunction against an attorney-general to prevent the execution of an act alleged to be unconstitutional, was denied, on the-ground that in the former cases the officer sued was specially charged with enforcing the unconstitutional act, whereas in the latter he was not necessarily so charged but his name afforded the plaintiff merely a means for testing the constitutionality of the statute, seems hardly convincing, or successful. The alleged distinction had better be abandoned, as has the attempt, once made, to find that the pecuniary or proprietary interests of the state had to be involved in the forbidden suit and not the governmental." It must be confessed that it is almost impossible to discover any guiding principle for determining when a suit against an officer is a suit against the State and most of those who have dealt with the subject have contented themselves with an enumeration of the cases, without for the most part any serious effort to educe an underlying principle or criticize inconsistencies."
CORPORATIONS EXERCISING PUBLIC POWERS
Though an officer of the State carrying out his official duties as the agent of the State has on so many occasions been held to enjby its immunity from suit, a somewhat different principle seems to prevail, at least in the federal courts, when the Government instead of confiding the performance of official duties to an individual or commission, organizes a corporati6n for this purpose, or purchases all or a part of the stock in such corporation. "It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates and to the business which is to be transacted. ' s Yet even this result has not commanded uniform support from the courts, for in the recent case of Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Railway Co. (United States, intervener) 8 the Circuit Court of Appeals held that the defendant railroad corporation, whose stock and property had been purchased by the federal Government, and which was engaged in performing governmental and public purposes, enjoyed the Government's immunity for the torts of its agents. On the other hand, the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, which was organized for the governmental building and operating of ships for the federal government, all of whose stock was owned by the United States and which entered into contracts "representing the United States of America" was deemed not to enjoy the Government's immunity from suit (except in the way prescribed by statute), but to be subject to suit like any other corporation, and this, although all its expenses and deficits and even judgments against it, are paid from Congres*sional appropriations. of the sanctity of the doctrine of State immunity, 9 0 would seem to indicate the vulnerability of the doctrine in the eyes of its most convinced proponent; for it seems hardly reasonable that the mere intermediation of a corporation organized and owned by the State for the performance of a particular function of the Government should alter so settled a principle as State immunity, a principle which is fully enforced when the enterprise is conducted by a State official or commissionerl --unless indeed the conclusion is drawn, as we think it must be, that the doctrine rests not on rational and substantial, but on antiquated and technical grounds, and that the courts eagerly seek artificial methods of escape from its implications. This seems the more apparent when it is observed that the Supreme Court has had no hesitation in finding these corporations to be Governmental agencies and instrumentalities for the purpose of escaping' the exercise upon them of the reserved powers of the states, such as the taxing power, whether the Government owned all1 2 or only some" 3 or none 94 of the stock. In England, a more logical result is attained by the conclusion that in determining whether or not a particular body or official is a "servant of the Crown" and protected by its shield from suit, the question of incorporation is really immaterial. 9 5
The suability and liability of a corporation organized by authority of a State to carry on some particular function of government is on the whole decided in State courts on more logical grounds than in the federal Supreme Court, though the conclusions are by no means uniform. These courts seek to determine primarily whether the corporation is a State agency acting without pecuniary profit or a private corporation acting in private interests, and therefore exempt or not from suit. 
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does not permit an action arising out of the torts of its officers.' 0 5 This is not altogether different from the narrow construction given to various statutes permitting the state to be sued on claims against it, where the courts assumed that the legislature merely intended to afford the claimant a remedy in the courts, but not to create any new grounds of state liability, such as for torts. 0 6 Thus, as a state agency it either cannot be sued at all, or if suable, it escapes liability for the torts of its agents and servants. It has been suggested that such corporations, in appointing agents and servants to perform public duties, are themselves merely superior officers deriving no individual or corporate benefits, but merely acting as appointing or employing agents for their principal, the State. Thus, so far as concerns delegable duties, both State and corporation escape legal responsibility for the torts of subordinates.°7 It is important then to determine who is the agent and who the principal. There is a tendency, moreover, occasionally to apply the "trust fund" doctrine, which exempts charitable institutions in some jurisdictions from liability for the torts of agents, to state institutions maintained for public, often charitable, purposes.
10 8
Courts dealing with state corporate agencies of the character just mentioned are occasionally driven to determine, as in the case of municipal corporations, whether the particular activity of the corporate agency was "governmental" or "corporate" in character, and the nature and purpose of the corporation, with a tendency to adopt the mistaken "ultra vires" doctrine and release the corporation from liability for the torts of its agents. 0 9 It often becomes necessary to determine whether the tort-feasor is an agency or sub-division of the State sharing its immuni- officers, about to enforce invalid statutes or otherwise act illegally, to be enjoined, the act being deemed, by a convenient fiction., their personal act. The ultra spres argument, *in its most extreme form, insuring complete 'immunity for torts of agents, reads as follows (quoting from Board of Education v. Volk (i905) .72 Ohio St. 469, 74 N. E. 646): "The board is not authorized to commit a tort, to be careless or negligent; and, when it commits a wrong or tort, it does not in that respect represent the district, and, for its negligence or tort in any form, the board cannot make the district liable."
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ties, or an independent contractor with the State."
1 As may be imagined the decisions are not harmonious, furnishing additional evidence, if that were needed, that the whole subject, enmeshed in artificialities and unsound distinctions, requires re-examination in the light of principle and reason.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
The peculiar nature of the federal government induced special rules governing the legal relations arising out of governmental invasion of private rights. Although the Constitution provides that "private property" shall not "be taken for public use without just compensation," there was down to 1855, due to the governmental immunity from suit, no legal means of making the requirement effective. Claimants against the Government were compelled to adjure Congress to redress their grievances. The defects of this system, both for the claimant and for the members of Congress, brought about in 1855 the establishment of the Court of Claims,"' with jurisdiction, first advisory, later made final, over specified types of claims. The Act provided:
"The said court shall hear and determine all claims founded 14pon any law of Congress, or upon any regulations of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government of the United States, which may be suggested to it by petition filed therein; and also all claims which may be referred to said .court by either house of Congress."
This act was slightly amended in z887 by adding, inter alia, to the words "law of Congress" the phrase "upon the Constitution of the United States," and adding after the clause referring to "any contract, express or implied." the clause "or for damages, liquidated or unliquidated, in cases not sounding in tort, in respect of which claims the party would be entitled to redress against the United States either in a court of law, equity or admiralty if the United States were suable."" 2 "Act of March 3, i887, c. 359 (24 Stat. at L. 5o5). Concurrent jurisdiction was given to the district and circuit courts in cases under $3,ooo. It is not intended to examine the history of the Court of Claims and the many special acts of Congress which have referred cases to the Court of Claims for judgment, advice or findings of fact. The history of the Court of Claims and some reference to its jurisdiction in specific cases will be found in the following literature: Judge Richardson, a member of the Court, History of the Court of Clains (1882) 7 So. L. REv. 78r, also printed in i7 Ct' Cl. 3, and printed separately; a scholarly article by Ernst 
Binney, Origh and development of legal recourse against the United States (igog)
57 AFv.P LAw EG. 372 and C. C. Binney, Element of tort as affecting the legal Aside from certain special statutes referring to the Court of Claims a few cases not included in the statute, including a few tort cases, some of which we shall take occasion to mention, the'Act of 1887, known as the Tucker Act, embodies the maximum concession which under general law Congress was willing to make to those sustaining injury at the hands of the United States. The Supreme Court, howev.er, has so construed the Act as to limit very materially the broad terms of relief which the Act appears to grant. For example, the Act gave jurisdiction to the Court of Claims in claims based "upon the Constitution of the United States." Judge Nott, one of the ablest judges the Court has had, pointed out in Stovall, Adm. v. United States""' that the purpose of this clause was to enable owners of property who, like Langford, 114 had been deprived of their property by the United States government or its officers, whether claiming the title or not, to recover in the Court of Claims the compensation to which the Constitution seemed to entitle them. But the Supreme Court has construed the clause. quite differently; in. fact, the clause seems to have added nothing to the limited jurisdiction theretofore exercised. 115 It would seem that when a claimant, like Langford or Hill,"' could show that he was the owner of property and that the United States Government, through its officers, had taken it from him for a public use, that he had done all that was necessary to prove his right to receive compensation under the Fifth Amendment. Not so. He must in addition prove that the Government has "taken" the property under an express or implied contract to pay for it. Thus, we find the Supreme Court asserting11
7 that "the right to bring suit against the United States but upon the existence of an implied contract entered into by the-United States." Even this would not be so serious were the words "taking" and "implied contract" given a fairly liberal construction protective of the private right. But awed by the inhibition against claims "sounding in tort" and by the traditional view -that the government's consent to be sued is to be construed as narrowly as possible, the Supreme Court has given an exceedingly technical construction to the terms "taking" and "implied contract" and a very wide interpretation to the clause "sounding in tort." Thus the physical act of "taking" must so greatly interfere with the private use that the injury and deprivation are permanent and substantial," 9 hence implying a contractual obligation to pay, and not merely temporary, or consequential, and therefore tortious' 20 There must be an intent to "take" which need not be expressed, however, but may be inferred from the circumstances. : "Acts done in the proper exercise of governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private prbperty, though their consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking within the meaning of the constitutional provision," establishes a general standard, rather than a helpful criterion for the determination of cases. The provision now so frequently found in state constitutions by which property taken "or damaged" must be paid for, should also be adopted by the federal government,kin view of the narrow construction given to the word "taken."
uHill v. United States (1893) 149 U. S. 593, 13 Sup. Ct. ioII; Langf ord v. 'United States (1879) 10 U. S. 341. Had Justice Shiras' dissenting opinion in Hill v. United States prevailed, namely, that it was only necessary to prove title and deprivation to invoke the Fifth Amendment, these artificial distinctions would will defeat recovery, for the taking is then tortious. The more flagrant and unjustifiable the Government's act, the less becomes its liability, hardly a commendable principle of law. Even a district attorney, by pleading the Government's title, or denying the plaintiff's right or title or an intent to take or pay, can, it seems, defeat the owner's just claim to compensation. Moreover, the circumstances must not negative the owner's consent or at least tacit acquiescence, otherwise the plaintiff will defeat that consensual relation, which is supposed to underlie the implied contract-implied in fact rather than law. 123 For mere evidence of enrichment of the Government is sufficient to raise the implication of payment; a qpasi-contractual obligation will -not be recognized, unless, as in tort cases, specially covered by a law of Congress conferring jurisdiction.1 24 Moreover, it is not possible, as it is in so many cases at common law, to waive the tort, and sue in assumpsit,1 25 though the English courts seem more disposed to permit the pursuit of a remedy by petition of right where the alleged breach of duty arose out of what was originhave become unnecessary. They were applied in the patent cases, Schillinger v. ally a contractual relation.1 2 Of course, the taking or contract, whether express or implied, must be authorized; anyone dealing with a government agent is bound by the limits of his actual, not ostensible, authority. To this requirement, the Supreme Court has given a very strict construction.
1 2 7 Unless a claimant is fortunate enough to be able to climb all these hurdles, he is likely to find his claim dismissed as "sounding in tort.' 12 8
The reluctance of the Stipreme Court to widen the relief of the individual injured and compelling him rather than the public at large to bear the risk of a defective public service, is due to the individualistic conceptions which lie at the foundation of the American theory of state immunity from suit and responsibility and to the erroneous belief that by being held to discharge obligations, the public service is hampered. As we shall endeavor to point out hereafter, quite the contrary is true.
In recent years a growing legislative tendency has been manifested to *assume liability for the torts of agents and officers. This is true both of the states and of the United States. It has already been observed that the United States has permitted suit to be brought in roads and collateral services and in establishing a'Shipping Board for the operation of merchant ships, the Government placed itself in the legal position of a private operator . 32 Congress providel in x9I9 for compensation for damage to property by army aircraft, 1 33 and in 1922, amending earlier acts, made provision for the satisfaction by the heads of the executive departments or independent establishments of the Government of claims for damage to or loss of private property not in excess of $I,OOO, "caused by the negligence of any officer or employee of the Government acting within the scope of his employment." 3 4 If the principle of tort responsibility of the Government has thus been recognized as to all branches of the federal public service, Congress ought easily to be persuaded that the limitation in amount to $i,ooo is unfair and indeed improper. If it is just and sound that the Government should assume responsibility to the public for the torts of its agents, like other corporations, then the principle should be acknowledged without limitation of liability and judicial relief should be afforded.
Great confusion was occasioned by the assumption during the war of government control over the railroad and telegraph systems of the country. Notwithstanding the provisions of section TO of the Act of Congress of March 21, 1918 that "carriers while under federal'control shall be subject to all laws and liabilities as common carriers .... and that in actions at law or suits in equity against the carrier. .... no defense shall be made . . . . that the carrier is an instrumentality or agency of the federal government," it seemed to many courts very doubtful whether, a company could constitutionally be rendered liable for an act done by the federal government and its employees. To overcome this doubt the Director General of Railroads issued a General Order to the effect that he should be named as defendant, but this only added to the confusion, for several courts promptly held it contrary to the statute and invalid, whereas others held it valid, Ct. 593, holding that the term "carriers" in the Act authorizing suits "against carriers" meant the systems and not the corporations and that Congress intended to grant a limited consent to suit against the government, the there was no certain means of paying any judgment and the Act of March 2t, 1918 had forbidden any levying of process against the property of the railroads. The confusion, largely arising out of the narrow construction given to an assumed governmental consent to suit, gave rise to a great amount of litigation, most of which might have been avoided had Congress and the Courts not labored under a traditional preconception against governmental liability to suit.
In the telegraph cases Congress had failed to provide even for the constitutionally doubtful method of a suit against the company or system or against the Government, and as the companies were not deemed operating agents of tlie Government, it would seem that rio one could be sued for torts committed by employees in the operation of the telegraph system, except possibly some more or less irresponsible subordinate employee personally negligent. 1386 Even the existence of an indemnity contract between the Government and the company by which the Government. agreed to hold the company harmless for judgments found against it during governmental control, did not, said the Supreme Court, authorize a suit against the company; and the absence of any special statute, of course, left the rule of governmental immunity from suit in full force. The fact that Judge Learned Hand permitted a suit to lie against the Government under the Tucker Act for breach of an implied contract to transmit a cable message during federal control of a cable company 37 opens the door but slightly and indicates to how great an extenit irresponsibility was substituted for responsibility by the assumption of federal control of the telegraph systems.
The question of governmental immunity from suit when engaged in the operation of a public service has been frequently litigated in admiralty in the case of injuries inflicted upon private vessels by ships owned or operated by the Government. Such government control and operation of merchant shipping has survived the war in many countries, and in the United States and England has led to an exhaustive examination of'the whole subject. The results are not harmonious or satisfactory. In the United States, the act creating the Shipping Board' '"'Western Union Telegraph Cb. v. Poston (1921) provided that merchant ships operated by the United States Shipping Board, including vessels purchased, chartered or leased from them, "shall be subject to all laws, regulations and liabilities governing merchant vessels, whether the United Stat~s be interested therein as owner, in whole or in part, or hold any mortgage, lien or other interest therein." After such a vessel had been arrested, however, 13 " -and the threat to the continuity of voyages and operations of government by arrest of vessels became apparent, a new statute was passed substituting for the former seizure and arrest of vessels and cargoes 140 an action in personam against the United States in admiralty causes arising out 'of acts of government-owned merchant vessels. This proper statutory submission to suit, without permitting an actual interference with the operations of government, is a concession to the exigencies of modern life and an indication that' the justice f gdvernmental operation with, rather than without, responsibility, is gradually being recognized. Yet even before this limited statutory recognition of amenability to suit for injuries committed by certain. government vessels, the courts had had frequent occasion to deal with the subject. They were moved by conflicting theories. The animistic admiralty theory which personifies the ship as the wrongdoer and permits a libel in rem "against the ship" regardless of ownership competed with the common law theory that public property enjoys the same immunity from suit as the sovireign owner himself, 1 1 and that a suit in rem "against the property" will not lie when there was no action against the owner in personam. It is not surprising that the effort to reconcile such divergent theories, both grounded in long usage, should have resulted in compromises, distinctions and inferences which, to say the least, make little convincing appeal to reason. The question has been complicated by the fact that courts often have had to deal with the status df ships owned by foreign sovereigns, and have permitted themselves, erroneously, to be influenced vessels of the Lighthouse Service shall be found responsible, and to the Secretary of the Navy, in the case of vessels of the Navy, not exceeding in either case $5oo in amount. The Barendrecht (1922, S. D. N on the mere question of ownership.', 54 The soundness of the theory that suit will lie when Government possession is not disturbed, is very questionable ;155 it may have been invented to justify on some plausible ground the enforcement of a lien, usually for salvage, against Government property. When Judge Mack, in his scholarly opinion in The Pesaro' 516 declined to exempt a merchant vessel owned by the Italian government from the local jurisdiction, especially as she was not immune in the Italian courts, he broke with the English rule of the Parlement BelgeI 57 and laid down a rule which modern life demands, for it is not conceivable that thousands of government ships should roam the seas on ordinary commercial errands and yet escape all responsibility to the law. But whether these Goyernment ships should actually be subject to arrest by the process of foreign courts is a more debatable question; the Act of Congress of March 9, 1920158 prevents arrest of vessels of the Shipping Board, leaving liability in persoiiam, and has sought to effect a similar freedom from arrest in. foreign ports. It will hardly be disputed that Government enterprise should not be physically interrupted by judicial process, but this implies the substitution of a voluntary admission of liability for transactions at least of a "nongovernmental" character, conceding for the moment the difficulty. of drawing an exact line. of demarcation between public or governmental and non-governmental functions.
159 But as the rule laid down in The Pesaro can hardly prevail over the protest of foreign governments,' it would be well in the international field to agree diplomatically upon a voluntary submission to the courts, either the foreign or home courts, in the case of vessels engaged..in commerce, as is provided in the case of United States government merchantmen, in the Act of March 9, 1920.
Not the least interesting of the anomalies arising from the attempt to reconcile th6 admiralty law with the common law in -respect to the -liability incurred by the torts of'those in charge of public vessels, brought against the city of New York because of a tollision caused by the negligent management of a municipal fire-boat in extinguishing a fire along the water-front. The suit was brought in persoam." 6 ' It was admitted that a municipal fire-engine equally negligently operated would, being used for governmental purposes, leave the city immune from liability, and that this was the local law in New York.
16 2 Yet
Justice White, exalting the supremacy and symmetry of the maritime law which personifies the wrongdoing ship, though conceding to the common law the immunity from suit-of the state, but not of the city, held the city liable for the injury done. His words warrant quotation, and might well be applied to the entire doctrine of immunity from jurisdiction and from the application of the ordinary rules of law which surrounds the activities of the state. "The disappearance of all symmetry in the maritime law .... which would thus arise [by conceding immunity] would, however, not be the only evil springing from the application of the principle relied on, sintce the maritime law which would survive would have imbedded in it a denial of justice. This must be the inevitable consequence of admitting the proposition which assumes that the maritime law disregards the rights of individuals to be protected in their persons and property from wrongful injury, by recognizing that those who are amenable to the jurisdiction of courts of admiralty are nevertheless endowed with a supposed governmental attribute by which they can inflict injury upon the person or property of another, and yet escape all responsibility therefor."
Yet where the vessel negligently operated was owned by the State of New York under the jurisdiction of the Superintendent of Public Works, the Supreme Court in I92I, in a suit brought in admiralty, had no difficulty in permitting Justice White's "denial of justice" to become imbedded in the maritime law, admitting the supremacy of the common law immunity from suit over the rule of liability in admiralty. 63 Thus we find that there is a vital difference between-the liability of a municipal corporation in its governmental activity of extinguishing a fire from the land side and from the water side, and again a vital difference in result,
-There is a conflict of authority as to whether a public vessel of a city may be arrested. depending on the ownership of the boat by the larger group known as the State or the smaller group known as the city. Distinctions of so artificial a character constitute, it is believed, a symptom of the senility of the doctrines on which they are founded.
But the apotheosis of the doctrine in admiralty was reached in 1922. In the case of United States v. Thompson' 6 it was held by the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Holmes, that a Government vessel could not commit an injury giving rise to a maritime lien, hence at no time, though .the vessel subsequently reached private hands, could such a lien be enforced." 65 This conclusion 'vas derived from the fact that inasmuch as the so-called lien could never have been enforced against the Government, therefore the original collision could not have been a "tort" or an act giving rise to a legal obligation. "Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law, but that are elusive to the grasp." Thus, the immediacy of the privilege of enforcement seems to be Justice Holmes' test of the existence of a claim against the Government. Nor can the Government, he says, be guilty of a fault or "tort" since it itself makes the law and is therefore not bound by it, a proposition to which Justice McKenna expressed vigorous dissent. The validity of this theory of Justice Holmes, which he founds upon the authority of Bodin, Hobbes and Austin, we shall have further occasion to examine. 166 But at this point it may be said that his decision leads to the conclusion that the court in previous cases erred in recognizing the validity of liens against public vessels.11 7 Moreover, if there never was a "tort" ab initio, it would seem wrong to permit, as has often been done, set-off and recoupment against the Government for damages Holmes. The British court takes the view that a lien, surviving, would diminish the value of Government property in case of sale, but in England at least, as already observed, the commander can be sued for collisions and the Government pays the judgment. See also The Sylvan Arrow [1923, C. A.] Prob. 220, where the lien under similar circumstances was denied because defendants were compelled to surrender their ship to the United States Government, during whose operation the collision occurred. Justice Holmes takes the ground that the Government, being immune from suit, is incapable of committing an injury giving rise to legal relations, for it is above the law. Chief Justice Waite in The Fidelity, supra note 154, also took the position that it was not want of power to sue, but want of liability, which exempted public vessels.
See infra. by collision and otherwise, where the Government commences the suit ;16s whereas the removal of the procedural difficulty of suing the state or impleading its property had previously been regarded as evidence of a desire where possible to do justice to the indvidual.' 6 9 Indeed, if Justice Holmes' theory is correct, even voluntary submission to suit would not enable the court to impose damages on the Government, for there never' was a liability and none could, it would seem, be created, by merely waiving the immunity from suit. The fact is, We venture to believe, that the theory is unsound, being dominated by a slavish worship of an antiquated conception of absolutism and finding in the absence Qf a "tort"-a term of private and not of public law-an absence of injury or operative fact of which the courts may properly take account when they can obtain jurisdiction.
QUASI-CORPORATIONS
The administrative organization in the United States has developed the county as the largest political subdivision of the State for the performance of what are called "governmental" functions. The county is created by the legislature for purposes of local government, with an elective or appointive official personnel, for the administration of local matters. It is a highly developed form of local self-government in the United States. Included within these so-called quasi-corporations-for they were not at first incorporated at all-are counties, towns, school districts, road districts and the like. In view of the fact that the people themselves have so direct a share in the management of these bodies, it is perhaps the more surprising that they were endowed by the courts with the shield of kingly sovereignty, and, with minor exception, were and are, in the absence of specific statute, not responsible foi the torts.of their agents. For us, interest lies in determining the grounds of this immunity.
In In that case, an unincorporated county was held immune from responsibility for an injury arising out of a defective bridge, because it had no corporate fuAd or the means of obtaining one, and it seemed impracticable to permit judgment to-be satisfied out of the assets of possibly a few individuals. Hence the injured individual, for practical reasons, was denied relief. Yet the only similarity between the situation in New England and the Russell case lay in the fact that the defendants were counties. The New England county was incorporated, had a corporate fund and the means of enlarging it by taxation and was charged bystatute with the duty of keeping highways in repair. Under the authority of Russell v. Devon, therefore, practically no reason for immunity can be found in these circumstances to exist, yet the Massachusetts court passed judgment for the defendant on the unconvincing ground that the county was a quasicorporation created by the legislature for purposes of. public policy and not voluntarily, like a city, and that as a State agency it was therefore immune. This poorly reasoned decision, based upon a case which contradicts rather than sustains it, has been followed very. generally in New England and has become the "common law" of the states of the United States, with few exceptions. 17 2 That a quite different rule prevails with respect to municipal corporations proper, in the case of highways and bridges, and that the distinctions are curiously sustained, will be presently noted.
As the old reasons for county immunity, mentioned in the Russell case, disappeared in fact, new reasois had to be devised. The usual ground was public policy, but on the nature of that policy the courts cannot agree. Only a few courts have gone so far as to suggest that the county is, like the state of which it is a political subdivision, immune from suit without consent.'
73
The great majority of the courts,, however, have put the immunity from substantive responsibility on the ground that the county was created for public purposes, charged with the performance of duties as an arm or branch of the state government, and cannot therefore be liable for failure or negligence in the performin Maryland, the distinction between the county in Russell v. Devon and the Maryland county, which was a corporation and had a corporate fund, was readily perceivel, and'liability imposed. Anne Arundel County v. Duckett (864) ance of its public-sometimes even called corporate-duties. The alleged distinction in this respect between counties and municipal corporations proper is said to lie in the further fact that counties and so-called quasi-corporations" generally are involuntary political divisions of the state organized without regard to the consent of the inhabitants, whereas municipal corporations proper, it is said, are voluntary associations organized under a franchise or charter from the State at the request and for the benefit and local advantage and convenience of the inhabitants.
The language of the Supreme Court of Texas in the case of Heigel v. Wichita County 7 4 is typical of that used by many other courts to explain the distinction: "Counties," said the Court, "are not corporations in the fullest sense of that term. They are commonly called, 'quasi-corporations.' They are created by the state for the purposes of government. Their functions are political and administrative, and the powers conferred, upon them are rather duties imposed than privileges granted. Cities, on the other hand, are deemed voluntary corporations, and, while they exercise political functions, it is considered that their 'charters are granted not so much with a view to the interests of the public as for the private advantage of their citizens. It is upon this distinction that the courts ordinarily base the difference in the rule of liability as applied to municipal corporations proper, and to quasi-municipal corporations, such as counties and townships. Other courts hold that, since a county is. but a political subdivision of the sthte, a suit against tle county is, in effect, a suit against the state,-and that, therefore, an action will. not lie without the-consent of the legislature. But upon whatever ground it should be placed, it is fairly well settled that in cases like this [injury sustained by reason of a defective bridge] cities are liable and couiities are not."'
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The precedents making this alleged distinction are so numerous that it is probably heresy to suggest that the formal differences to which the. courts direct attention are without substantial merit or justification for a difference in doctrine. Both county and city are created by the people, often the same people, appropriately represented, for the purpose of better administering their public business' 76 and the distinctions made, as we shall have further occasion to observe hereafter, are for the most part artificial and have been repudiated, though not always with the same result, by a number of courts. declaring counties municipal corporations: !'A county is a municipal corporation, comprising the inhabitants within its boundaries, arid formed for the purpose of exercising the powers and discharging the duties of local government, and the administration of public affairs conferred upon it by law.'
